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GENERAL OVERVIEW OF COMMON-POOL RESOURCE PROJECT
Clarification of the Concept of Common-Pool Resource (CPR)
The literature describing the problems that individuals using common-
pool resources (CPRs) face often predict different outcomes and recommend 
contradictory policies.  Creating centralized agencies and creating private 
property institutions have both been recommended as the only way to solve 
problems involved in using common-pool resources.  The first task of the CPR 
project was to clarify the basic terms related to the study of collective 
action problems in CPRs.  This clarification was a necessary prerequisite to 
formal game theoretical modelling, in-depth analysis of case studies from 
field settings, and laboratory experiments of environments motivated by 
theoretical modelling and field data.
Since the work of R. Hardin (1971) and Dawes (1973), demonstrating that 
some CPR situations could be represented by an N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma, 
many scholars have presumed that all public goods and all CPR situations 
shared that underlying structure (for important exceptions see Kimber, 1981; 
Runge, 1981, 1984; and Taylor, 1987).  But even when the focus is narrowed to 
CPRs, the incentives confronting individuals in natural settings are not 
adequately described by games with a dominant strategy for every player. 
Consequently, a major task was to define the characteristics of a CPR as 
precisely as possible. 
The term common-pool resource refers to a sufficiently large natural or 
man-made resource for which it is costly (but not impossible) to exclude 
potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use.  To understand 
the processes of organizing and governing CPRs, it is essential to distinguish
between the resource system and the flow of resource-units produced by the 
system, while still recognizing their interdependence.  Resource systems are 
stocks capable of producing flows.  Examples of resource systems include 
fishing grounds, groundwater basins, grazing areas, irrigation canals, 
bridges, and mainframe computers.  Resource units are appropriated from 
resource systems; for example, the tons of fish harvested from a fishing 
ground or the acre-feet of water withdrawn from a groundwater basin or an 
irrigation canal.  The appropriation process can be simultaneous or 
sequential.  While the resource system is subject to joint use and/or 
provision, the resource units are not.  Improvements to the system are 
available to all appropriators.  All appropriators benefit from maintenance 
performed on an irrigation canal, a bridge, or a computer system whether they 
contribute or not.  On the other hand, the resource units consumed by one user
are not available to others.  The fish harvested by one boat are not landed by
another boat.  Nor, can the water spread on one field be spread on another.
Failure to distinguish between the subtractability of the resource units
and the jointness of the resource system has contributed to past confusion 
about the relationship of CPRs to public or collective goods.

  The cost of 
physically excluding joint appropriators from the resource or from 
improvements made to the resource system is similar to the high costs of 
excluding beneficiaries from public goods.  This shared attribute is 
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responsible for the ever-present temptation to free ride that exists in regard
to both CPRs and public goods.  Theoretical propositions that are derived 
solely from the difficulty of exclusion are applicable to the provision of 
both CPRs and collective goods.  
"Crowding effects" and "overuse" are problems arising in CPRs, but 
absent from pure public goods.  The subtractability of resource units, 
together with overuse, leads to exploitation of the CPR beyond optimal or safe
yield.  When the CPR is a man-made structure, such as a bridge, too many 
crossings lead to congestion.  When the CPR is a biological resource, such as 
a fishery, too many fish landed will destroy the fishery.
Parallel to the distinction between resource systems and resource units 
is the distinction between the two broad classes of CPR problems, 
appropriation and provision.  Appropriation problems relate to the allocation 
of the flow of resource units from the resource system and the conflict of 
this allocation between appropriators.  Provision problems relate to the 
system that produces this flow.  Provision problems are concerned with the 
implications of alternative institutions for assigning responsibility for 
building, restoring, or maintaining the resource system.  Appropriation 
problems are time-independent; provision problems are time-dependent.  In 
field settings these problems are closely related.  The actual structure of 
appropriation and provision problems depends on the particular configuration 
of the physical world, the rules in use, and the attributes of appropriators. 
In theoretical applications and in laboratory experiments, one can examine 
these problems independently so as to understand some aspects of CPR problems 
without the complexity added by focusing on two different problems at the same
time.  Ultimately, however, both problems are faced by real appropriators in 
natural settings.
When appropriation problems are not solved, individuals tend to invest 
more inputs than are economically needed to earn the highest return on the 
effort or to have substantial interference as among the efforts of different 
appropriators.  In either case, the net yield that could have been returned 
(called rents by natural resource economists) is dissipated.  In an open-
access

 CPR, overappropriation is likely to be endemic (Gordon, 1954; Scott, 
1955).

  In a limited-access CPR, overappropriation may be less severe, 
depending on the appropriation rules, monitoring, and enforcement.  If the 
spatial and temporal distribution of resource units is heterogeneous and 
uncertain, there exists conflict in the assignment of appropriation rights. 
Appropriators face a further problem of assignment.  Many fishing grounds are 
characterized by "fishing spots" that vary in their productivity.  Farmers who
extract water from the head of an irrigation system can obtain more water than
farmers who are located at a tail-end position.  When appropriators consider 
the assignment of rights and duties to the use of a CPR to be unfair, 
uneconomic, uncertain, and/or inappropriately enforced, this may adversely 
affect their willingness to invest in provision activities.  The particular 
rules used to regulate appropriation affect monitoring and policing costs and 
the type of strategic behavior that occurs between appropriators and monitors 
(the detection/deterrence game).

When provision problems are not solved, the resource system is not 
maintained in an optimal state and its survival may be threatened.  Provision 
problems may occur on the supply side and/or on the demand side.  The supply 
side problem relates to the construction or maintenance of the system.  If 
appropriators act independently, they can expect suboptimal provision due to 
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free riding.  The demand side problem relates to the intertemporal impact of 
appropriation on the resource system itself.  Many of the dynamic models of 
"rent dissipation" in the fisheries literature (Clark, 1976, 1980) focus on 
the time-dependent relationship between current withdrawals and future yields.
The above conceptual framework (developed in detail in Gardner, et al., 
1989) provides an analytical foundation on which to build.  The three major 
activities of the project all build on this foundation.  They are:  (1) the 
formal analysis of the relationship between CPR institutions and underlying 
physical domains; (2) the design and testing of CPR dilemmas in a laboratory 
setting, and (3) the coding and analysis of CPR case studies -- are all 
performed with this framework in mind.  Although appropriation and provision 
problems are empirically linked within natural CPR settings, they are 
analytically more tractable when studied separately.  
 
The Formal Analysis of Relationship between CPR Institutions and Underlying 
Physical Domains
Our research has examined the relationship between underlying 
institutions and physical domains using the framework of game theory.  The 
rules of a game include both physical and deontological statements.  Physical 
statements tell what players are expected to find physically necessary, 
possible, or impossible to do.  Deontological statements tell what players are
expected to find obligatory, permitted, or forbidden to do.  These are very 
different realms, subject to different forms of change.  Human intervention 
cannot change fundamental physical regularities, such as the laws of physics 
and biology.  People can use knowledge about such regularities, however, to 
develop new technologies that reduce the cost of many actions.  Change is 
wrought by finding more efficient uses of physical laws rather than by 
changing the laws themselves.  Deontic regularities, by contrast, exist 
primarily within a human domain.  These regularities involve what people 
perceive to be right or wrong actions or states of the world to affect in 
particular kinds of situations.  As such, deontic regularities are context-
specific constraints that human beings create and change by self-conscious 
choice or by evolutionary processes.
Game theory ordinarily takes a particular game as given and proceeds to 
solve for its equilibrium outcomes.  Outcomes are thus dependent on physical 




When the rules change, the resulting game may produce incentives leading to 
the same, improved, or worse outcomes for the participants.  Of special 
interest to policy analysts are rule changes (reforms) that lead to improved 
outcomes.  Our work has been interested in the reform of certain naturally 
occurring games, in particular, fishing games.
Much of the world's fishing occurs in contested waters.  Conflicts arise
between nations when international conventions overlap, such as the 200 mile 
limit (Canada vs. France, U.K. vs. Iceland, U.K. vs. Belgium).  Even more 
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frequently, conflicts arise in those coastal or inland waters where neither 
property rights nor user rights are clearly defined.  In settings where all of
the rules are set at their default position,

 the resulting rule configuration
operationalizes Hobbes's concept of "the state of nature."  The only factors 
affecting the structure of a fishing game in a state of nature are those 
related to the physical domain on which the game is played.  These include the
number and value of fishing spots, their regularity over time, the cost of 
traveling to them, and the technology available to fishers in case of 
conflict.  Using Harsanyi-Selten equilibrium selection theory to focus on a 
unique equilibrium outcome, we can control for the effects of physical 
regularities on the extent of fighting between fishers over contested waters. 
Two main behavioral regularities emerge from such a study.  (1) If fishers are
of fairly different fighting ability and the fishing spots are of considerably
different value, then the stronger fisher will fish the more valuable spot, 
and no conflict will be observed.  (2) If fishers are fairly evenly matched 
and the fishing spots are of nearly equal value, then a contest is likely on 
one or more of the spots.  (For details see Gardner and E. Ostrom, 
forthcoming.)  As rules are changed from a default condition, the options 
available to players are less controlled by the physical domain and more 
controlled by human prescriptive intervention.  Not all rule changes are 
necessarily an improvement, however.  It is possible to adopt rule changes 
leading to increased conflicts.  It is also possible--and this is the 
empirically more interesting case--to find rule changes that lead to fewer 
fights among fishers and a more efficient allocation of fishing resources.  
We have studied the effect of a change in the authority rule, specifying
who can fish where, at a nondefault option.  A classic rule of allocation used
throughout the ages to settle disputes over contested waters is "first in 
time, first in right" used along the shores of such diverse countries as India
and Brazil (Raychaudhuri, 1980; Forman, 1970).  Such a rule creates, in 
effect, a "temporary usufructuary property right" that allows fishers to 
change locations from day to day without conflict.  On a physical domain where
fighting is expected to occur, this has the desirable effect of reducing the 
amount of fighting.  It will still not lead, however, to an optimal allocation
of resources.  Fishers may still engage in a race to the best spot.
An authority rule that does address the excess travel issue is the prior
announcement rule, such as is found among the impoverished fishers living 
along the shores of Bahia, Brazil.  A good example of this is the port of 
Valena, where the local fishers have identified, mapped, and named 258 fishing
spots.  When a captain wishes to fish in a particular spot, he records his 
plans in a public forum--the local bar--and marks the location where he 
intends to fish.  One other witness, also a fisher, is required.  The captain 
then marks his claim the day prior to fishing by anchoring a canoe at the 
spot.  The fishing captains enforce the resultant right to fish, thus 
maintaining the entire fishing system (Cordell and McKean, 1986).  The game 
resulting from such a rule system is essentially one move long, an 
announcement move, and there are no conflicts observed.
An alternative authority rule that is outcome equivalent to the prior 
announcement rule is the prearranged rotation rule.  When the preassignment is
by lottery, such a rotation system assigns fishing spots on an equitable basis
to all eligible fishers.  Alanya, Turkey, an inshore fishery, provides an 
intriguing example.  Prior to instituting this rule, there had been 
considerable conflict over access to the better fishing spots (Berkes, 1986). 
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The Alanya fishers mapped and named all spots.  In September of each year, 
licensed fishers in the village draw lots to gain access to a specific fishing
spot on the first day of the season.  As the season progresses, they then 
rotate over the spots.  This system is relatively easy to monitor and enforce,
and has been maintained for over 15 years, primarily through the verbal and 
physical actions of the fishers themselves.  From a game-theoretic standpoint,
however, there is a big difference between a prior announcement rule and a 
prearranged rotation rule.  In the former, there are still moves left to the 
players, but in the latter, the only move left is to chance.
We have also completed an analysis of the effect of monitoring and 
sanctioning arrangements in an irrigation setting (Weissing and E. Ostrom, 
1991).  In a series of four models, we start with a two-person irrigator game 
where one player is the "turntaker" and decides between taking an authorized 
quantity of water or stealing, while the other player chooses between 
monitoring or not monitoring the behavior of the turntaker.  The second model 
extends this two-person game into a N-person game.  In the third model, a 
mechanical guard (or dummy player) is added that monitors the turntaker and 
discovers infractions with varying probabilities.  In the fourth model, the 
mechanical guard is replaced with a real player that must be motivated to 
monitor.  The probability of stealing and monitoring at Nash equilibria 
depends upon the parameters of the game including the number of irrigators 
involved, the size of the punishment that can be inflicted, the reward given 
to irrigators or guards who discover a stealing event, the loss that is 
inflicted on others, and the cost of monitoring.  At equilibrium, the 
probability of stealing is never zero in Models 1, 2, and 4.  In other words, 
only a mechanical guard can be totally effective in eliminating stealing.  In 
all other arrangements, there is always some stealing (and usually, some 
monitoring) going on.  The comparative statics generate both intuitive and  
counterintuitive results.  In Model 2, for example, an increase in the value 
of any one of the parameters, within the regime of a completely mixed 
equilibrium, produce the following consequences on the equilibrium strategies:
Effect on:
Probability of Probability of




 discovery of a
 stealing event decrease no change
Loss imposed on
 irrigators from a
 stealing event decrease no change
Cost of monitoring increase no change
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Experimental Design and Testing of CPR Environments
As discussed earlier, no single environment defines the "CPR Problem." 
Depending on the physical characteristics of the resource and/or the 
institutional framework of the existing user group, a complex set of 
interrelated decision problems may exist.  How does one, therefore, go about 
designing and parameterizing an experimental environment to analyze a "CPR 
Problem"?
Our line of reasoning used two main criteria:  (1) the separation of CPR
problems into appropriation and provision problems and (2) the construction of
a baseline foundation on which to build a structure of more complex and 
interrelated experiments.  These two criteria led to the design and software 
development that has been used in all of our experiments.  We sketch the 
decision environment faced by our experimental subjects: 
At the beginning of each experimental session, subjects were told they would 
be making a series of investment decisions, that all individual 
investment decisions were anonymous to the group, and that at the end of
the experiment they would be paid privately (in cash) their individual 
earnings.  Subjects then proceeded, at their own pace, through a set of 
instructions that described the investment decisions.  Subjects were 
told that each period they would be endowed with a given number of 
tokens, which they would invest between two markets.  Market 1 was 
described as an investment opportunity in which each token yielded a 
fixed (constant) rate of output and that each unit of output yielded a 
fixed (constant) return.  Market 2 (the CPR) was described as a market 
which yielded a rate of output per token dependent upon the total number
of tokens invested by the entire group.  The rate of output at each 
level of group investment was described in functional form as well as 
tabular form. Subjects were informed that they would receive a level of 
output from Market 2 that was equivalent to the percentage of total 
group tokens they invested.  Further, subjects knew that each unit of 
output from Market 2 yielded a fixed (constant) rate of return.
Our environment most closely parallels that of a limited access CPR (see
for example, Clark, 1980, and Cornes and Sandler, 1986).  All experiments were
conducted using the PLATO computer system at Indiana University.  This 
interactive system allows for minimal experimental interaction, across 
experiment control on procedures, and facilitates the complex accounting that 
follows any decision period. 
Our experiments focused on rent dissipation in a limited access CPR.  
Would subjects ignore the impact of their own investment decisions on the 
productivity of others investing in the CPR (our Market 2)?  If subjects did 
exhibit such behavior, what factors would affect the degree of rent 
dissipation? Our first line of inquiry, focused on:  (a) subject 
sophistication (experience) in the investment environment, (b) the specific 
parameterizations for the investment return from Markets 1 and 2, and (c) 
whether subjects were allowed to discuss as a group the strategy space for the
social dilemma they faced.
Below, we sketch several empirical regularities that were robust across 
experimental replications:
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(1)Rents accrued (on average) at approximately 33% of optimum.  This 
observation is based on 27 experiments (570 investment decisions) across
several experimental parameterizations.
(2) Subject sophistication (experience in the decision environment) led to 
significant reductions in accrued rents.  On average, experienced 
subjects made investment decisions that led to the accrual of rents at a
level 11% lower than that of inexperienced subjects.  This result is 
consistent with experimental results reported in other experimental 
studies of social dilemmas (see Isaac, Walker, and Thomas, 1984).
(3) Across experimental replications, we observed a general pattern where 
rents decayed toward zero then rebounded as subjects reduced the level 
of investment in the common-pool resource.  Further, we generally 
observed a pattern in which average rents decreased with repeated 
decision periods.
(4) Holding number of investors constant, an increase in investment resources 
available to individual subjects tended to reduce average rents.  The 
most striking result is the high level of rent dissipation found in 
experiments in which subjects were endowed with 25 tokens (as opposed to
10 tokens) to invest.  In our 25 Token Design, rents averaged only 1% of
optimum.  This compared to approximately 37% for the design in which 
each subject was endowed with only 10 tokens. 
(5) Communication significantly increases rents as a percentage of maximum 
(see Figure 1.1).  All experiments began with a series of 10 decision 
periods in which there was no opportunity to communicate.  For 
comparison purposes, we conducted a set of baseline experiments in which
communication was never allowed.  We conducted communication with two 
treatments:  (1) the communication mechanism was provided to subjects at
no cost and (2) the subjects had to provide the communication mechanism 
by their own monetary contributions.  For both treatments, the 
opportunity to communicate began after decision period 10.  In the no-
cost experiments, players had the opportunity to communicate between 
every decision period following period 10. In the costly communication 
experiments, players had the right to fund the communication mechanism 
between every decision period following period 10.  Panel 1 shows that 
relative to the baseline experiments, efficiency increased from 30% to 
98% with the introduction of costless communication.  When communication
was provided as a "costless" institution, players successfully used the 
opportunity to:  (a) calculate coordinated rent improving strategies, 
(b) devise verbal agreements to implement these strategies, and (c) deal
with nonconforming players.  Panel 2 shows the aggregate results from 
our experiments with costly communication.  On average, efficiency in 
these groups increased from approximately 42% to 80%.  In all three 
experiments, the problem of providing the communication mechanism 
diminished the ability to coordinate and deal with players who cheated 
on a previous agreement.
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The Coding and Analysis of CPR Case Studies 
The fourth activity we have undertaken has been the identification of 
in-depth case studies that describe how CPR appropriators have succeeded or 
failed in efforts to manage inshore fisheries, small- to medium-sized 
irrigation systems, communal forests, or grazing lands.  Identifying and 
coding in-depth case studies is undertaken in several steps.  Most of this 
manual is devoted to an in-depth discussion of this activity.
First, we developed a bibliography that includes published and 
unpublished CPR case materials as well as relevant theoretical work.  In 
January of 1989, we published a hard-copy version of a bibliography entitled 
Common Pool Resources and Collective Action: A Bibliography, compiled by the 
Department of Political Science librarian, Fenton Martin.

  The bibliography 
contains 4,977 items arranged according to sectors (Fishery Resources, Water 
Resources, Forest Resources, Grazing Areas) and regions of the world as well 
as including a section 
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on pure theory and experimental work.  The bibliography has been distributed 
to scholars and research centers in the U.S. and many other countries.  Since 
January of 1989, we have added over 1750 new citations to a supplemental 
bibliography and continue to maintain the bibliography in machine readable 
form.

  We have received frequent requests for computer-assisted searches of 
the bibliography by researchers who want to know what has been written about a
particular sector or region.  We have also provided machine readable copies of
the full bibliography and supplements to several research libraries located in
different parts of the world.  We are pleased to hear that our bibliography 
contains references to cases not previously known to librarians in charge of 
specialized collections specific to the specialized area.
In addition to a systematic collection of bibliographic citations, we 
have established a major in-house collection of published and unpublished, 
original case studies of CPR resources.  We have archived over 1800 documents 
and receive new case materials regularly.

  Considerable international 
interest has been focused on our collection and the CPR project more 
generally.  Scholars from Denmark, India, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, 
France, and the U.S. have spent or intend to spend several months in 
Bloomington working on these materials and our data base.

  We have also been 
asked to archive, abstract, and code in-depth CPR case studies contained in 
archive files and never published.

The aim of collecting these in-depth materials is not simply that of 
archiving and cataloging, although we have seriously pursued these 
responsibilities.  The aim is to identify a subset of in-depth cases that can 
be used to code structured data about these empirical settings and to analyze 
the patterns of behavior associated with them.  To identify codable materials,
we first screen every document.  A member of the CPR project staff rapidly 
reads the article, monograph, archive file, thesis or dissertation and makes 
initial decisions based on that reading.  First, the screener ascertains 
whether the publication contains high-quality information about a particular 
location.  If the materials do not describe a particular case, the screener 
identifies the type of document (pure theory, background on particular types 
of resources in a region, or good sectorial information), writes a short 
abstract, and enters this information in the CPR data base.  If the materials 
do describe a particular case, the screener evaluates the quality of the data 
contained, writes a short abstract, and again enters this information in the 
data base.  We have now finished screening and abstracting 1600 documents.
We constructed the CPR data base so that it could easily be used by 
other researchers.  We committed ourselves to use a commercially available 
program that would run on a micro-computer to insure the capability of 
transferring the data base to other sites.  After studying the assets and 
liabilities of many different relational data base programs, we decided to use
RBASE.  It is powerful and user-friendly.  It only takes a few days before a 
new user is able to undertake analyses of the data base.  The abstracts 
written as part of the screening process have already become a valuable tool 
in and of themselves, since they can be searched for conceptual or substantive
content using the powerful RBASE boolean search capabilities.  We have 
distributed the abstracts written about fishery resources, for example, to a 
number of fishery experts and received enthusiastic responses.
The screening process is important as part of our data collection 
efforts, as it is the way that we identify cases that we can enter in the more
extended data base.  To actually code a case, we require that it be written by
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a researcher who has spent considerable time in the field and contains key 
information about the structure of the resource, the rules used in organizing 
the resource, the strategies adopted by the appropriators, and the outcomes 
achieved.  All of the variables that we use in our formal models and 
experimental laboratory settings (and many more) are contained in the extended
data base. 
We have coded and entered 50 irrigation cases, 32 fishery cases, and 3 
cases describing forestry, grazing, and other types of resources.  We have 
thus captured in a structured form the results of at least 40 person-years of 
prior fieldwork conducted by resource economists, political scientists, rural 
sociologists, anthropologists, historians, and engineers.

We are now developing a specialized data base on Nepali irrigation 
systems because a very large number of outstanding case studies have been 
written and made available to us.  Most of these cases include reliable and 
valid engineering and economic performance data that is usually difficult to 
obtain.  The diversity of CPR institutions that exist in Nepal will be 
extremely useful in our proposed research.  In order to gain an initial and 
rapid overview of these systems, we have developed a short coding form 
containing 70 variables and have coded 124 cases using this form.  After we 
complete the short-form coding, we will undertake the much slower task of a 
complete coding for each case.  We expect to include over 100 Nepali 
irrigation systems in our CPR data base.  
In addition to making substantial progress in the development of a 
useful data base on CPR institutions and their performance, we have now 
completed several analyses of the case materials.  The first major work based 
on the cases is a book by Elinor Ostrom entitled Governing the Commons 
published by Cambridge University Press in 1990 in the series on the 
"Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions" edited by James E. Alt and 
Douglass C. North.  The presumption that all users of a CPR are trapped in a 
Prisoners' Dilemma situation has dominated most research and policy analysis 
during the past two decades.  The book examines two sets of cases where the 
appropriators have escaped from the "traps" of resource destruction or rent 
dissipation.  In the first set of cases, appropriators centuries ago 
established CPR institutions that limit where, when, how, and how many 
resource units can be withdrawn from a CPR.  These institutions and the 
corresponding CPRs have survived ever since.  Little is known about the 
origins of these institutions but their effectiveness is well established.  
The second set of cases includes more recent events where the processes of 
transforming CPR institutions are well documented.  In contrast to these 
"successful" cases, a third set of cases involves settings where appropriators
remain trapped in dilemma type situations and suffer the consequences of 
severe rent dissipation or free riding behavior.
The central question of the book, therefore, is why and how some 
appropriators escape from the presumed tragedies of the commons while others 
do not.  The specific institutions that appropriators have created in the 
successful cases vary from one to another so much that the analyst cannot 
point to the adoption of particular rules as the answer to this question.  
Rather, it appears that successful CPR institutions are characterized by a 
series of design principles that account for their success in sustaining CPRs 
and in gaining the compliance of generations of appropriators to the rules 
adopted.  A set of seven design principles characterize all of the successful 
CPR institutions and an eighth is used in the larger, more complex cases.  The
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"failure" cases are characterized by one or two of these design principles at 
most.  These are listed in Table 1.1.  The book analyzes how institutions that
meet these design principles affect the incentives of CPR appropriators so 
that they are willing to commit themselves to these institutions, to monitor 
each others conformance, and to replicate the institutions across generations.
A further question the book addresses is what conditions enhance the 
likelihood of appropriators adopting institutions that meet these design 
criteria.  The conjectures presented in this book constitute part of the 
"grist" for our future project.  Arguments that are developed informally in 
the book will be subjected to formal analysis.  Empirical regularities found 
in the initial set of cases will be tested on a much larger set of cases.  
Consequently, the book can be viewed as an extended progress report for our 
initial project rather than as a final report for a completed project.  
In addition to this analysis, S. Y. Tang completed in 1989 a 
dissertation entitled, "Institutions and Collective Action in Irrigation 
Systems."  The dissertation has subsequently been awarded the Leonard White 
aware for the best dissertation in the field of Public Administration by the 
American Political Science Association.  An article drawn from the 
dissertation has appeared in Public Administration Review (Tang, 1991).  A 
book based on the dissertation is being published by the Institute for 
Contemporary Studies in San Francisco.
The dissertation combines the institutional framework of our project 
with recent work on transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975, 1985).  As 
an empirical base, Tang analyzes the 47 irrigation cases contained in the CPR 




Design Principles Illustrated by Long-Enduring CPR Institutions
1.  Clearly Defined Boundaries 
Individuals or households with rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR 
and the boundaries of the CPR itself are clearly defined.
2.  Congruence Between Appropriation and Provision Rules and Local Conditions
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of 
resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules 
requiring labor, material, or money. 
3.Collective Choice Arrangements
Most individuals affected by operational rules can participate in modifying 
these rules.
4.Active Monitoring 
Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behavior, are 
accountable to the appropriators and/or are the appropriators 
themselves.
5.  Graduated Sanctions
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to receive graduated 
sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) from
other appropriators, officials accountable to these appropriators, or 
from both.
6.Conflict Resolution Mechanisms
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost, local arenas 
to resolve conflict among appropriators or between appropriators and 
officials.
7.  Minimal Recognition of Rights to Organize
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not 
challenged by external governmental authorities.
For CPRs that are part of larger systems:
8.Nested Units
Organization of appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict 
resolution and governance activities are undertaken by smaller units 
that are nested within larger units.
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Table 2.1
The Dimensionality of Outcome Measures in Irrigation Systems
  Good                 Rule             Adequate            Number
Maintenance          Conformance         Water            of Cases
Yes Yes Yes 21
Yes Yes No  8
Yes No No  4
No No No 13
No Yes No  1
___
47
Coefficient of Reproducibility: 1 - 1/(47x3) = 0.99
Source:  S. Y. Tang (1989) "Institutions and Collective Action in Irrigation
        Systems," Table 4.1, p. 79.
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discovered that three of the coded outcome measures can be arrayed as a one-
dimensional Guttman scale with a coefficient of reproducibility of .99.  These
three measures are whether:  (1) the irrigation system provides adequate water
given the crop patterns adopted by the farmers, (2) the appropriators 
generally follow the rules governing appropriation and provision activities, 
and (3) the irrigation systems are well maintained (see Table 2.1).
One might surmise that the adequacy of the water in an irrigation system
is not subject to institutional control but simply a physical condition that 
is present or absent.  In an analysis of community irrigation systems (what we
call appropriator organized (AO) systems more generally) as contrasted to 
governmentally organized irrigation systems, Tang shows that all the latter 
systems use a single boundary rule to define access to irrigation water.  This
rule is that every farmer in the command area has a right to water and every 
farmer outside the command area has no such right.  AO systems, on the other 
hand, use a variety of boundary rules, including command area, but also 
involving shares, membership fees, and differential access.  Table 3.1a shows 
the relationship between boundary rules and adequacy of the water supply; 
Table 3.1b, the relationship between boundary rules and rule conformance/ 
maintenance.
In the initial design of governmentally organized irrigation systems, 
the incentives for officials are to demonstrate the size of the project and 
the number of irrigators that will be benefited.  The resulting official 
command areas of many governmentally organized irrigation systems are much 
larger than can be supported by the sources of water available (Palanisami and
Easter, 1986; see also Wade, 1984).  When appropriators design their own 
institutions, they are highly motivated to insure that those who contribute 
resources to provide and maintain the system are assured of an adequate supply
of water.  Thus, the adequacy of water made available to irrigators is not 
simply an external condition that must be lived with.  Rather, it affects the 
type of institutions used to regulate appropriation and the incentives facing 
those who devise institutions.  
Coastal fisheries are often governed by institutional arrangements, 
devised 
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by fishers, that limit who can enter fisheries and how harvesting of fish must
be conducted.  In Edella Schlager's dissertation, "Model Specification and 
Policy Analysis: The Governance of Coastal Fisheries," (Schlager, 1990) she 
presents an analysis and explanation of these institutional arrangements.  
This explanation is based on data from case studies of thirty different 
coastal fisheries located throughout the world.  Using an institutional 
analysis approach, the problematic situations fishers confront are examined.  
These involve problems related to the flows of fish through fishing grounds, 
or stock externalities;  and problems related to the physical space 
constituting fishing grounds, such as assignment problems and technological 
externalities.  The types of problematic situations fishers attempt to resolve
by cooperating to devise property rights and rules to govern the utilization 
of their fishing grounds are also examined.  Fishers typically focus upon 
governing the physical space of their grounds as opposed to managing the flows
of fish.  Finally, the performance of different institutional arrangements, 
and how performance varies depending upon how the arrangements are structured,
are evaluated.  Groups of fishers that possess more complete sets of property 
rights in their fishing grounds, and who have devised rules defining the 
harvesting actions they can take, typically achieve superior outcomes to those
fishers who do not have as well defined institutional arrangements.
    An institutional analysis approach to fisheries differs significantly from
the standard approach used by policy analysts.  The bionomic model is based on
the assumption that fisheries are "common property", meaning that no 
institutional arrangements exist to limit access or regulate harvesting 
activities.  In addition, the model presumes a single problematic situation, 
that of stock externalities, and fails to recognize significant problems 
arising in relation to multiple fishers interacting within the limited space 
of fishing grounds.  As a consequence, policies based on the bionomic model, 
and developed for open access, unregulated situations have failed when applied
to coastal fisheries where institutions already exist, and the institutional 
arrangements devised by fishers have, in some cases, been seriously harmed by 
the imposition of these policies.
Notes for Section I
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.  See, for example, the debate about the effect of group size on the provision of
a good summarized in R. Hardin (1982: ch. 3).
.  Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975) carefully distinguish between an open-access
CPR where no one has any property rights and a closed-access CPR where a well-
defined group owns property in common.  "Common-property resources" is a term that
is still used inappropriately in many instances to refer to both open-access and
closed-access CPRs.
.  Exactly how one models this depends on many underlying parameters.  One that
is essential to the prediction of full rent dissipation is that the underlying
appropriation function (usually called a production function in this literature) is
characterized by diminishing returns (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979: 56).  While this is
a  reasonable  assumption  to  make  in  many  environments,  the  dependance  of  the
incentive  structure  on  underlying  parameters,  such  as  the  shape  of  the
appropriation  function,  is  a  key  point  we  are  trying  to  make.   CPRs  vary
substantially in regard to their values on these underlying parameters.  Two CPRs
identical in almost all respects except the range of variation found in regard to a
important underlying parameter may need quite different representations in terms of
their strategic structure.
.  A third appropriation problem has to do with technological externalities (see
Gardner, E. Ostrom, and Walker, 1989).
.  See Gardner and E. Ostrom (Appendix A) for a discussion of default rules.
.  The compilation and publication of this bibliography was partially supported
by a small USAID grant (DHR-1096-G-SS-6042-00) and is thus not shown in our list of
publications  resulting  from  our  current  NSF  grant.   Indiana  University  also
provided extensive support for this activity.
.  Since January 1989, the bibliography activity has been supported by the
current NSF grant and by Indiana University.
.  On two recent trips to Nepal, for example, Elinor Ostrom has brought back
close to 100 in-depth case studies of small- to medium-sized irrigation systems in
Nepal.  Some of these were "published" in Nepal by Government agencies in initial
runs of 25 to 50 copies.  Others were reports written and filed in archives of
research units there (the Nepal office of the International Irrigation Management
Institute and the Irrigation Management Center, for example).  We may have now
amassed the largest collection of materials on Nepal's irrigation systems outside
of Nepal.
.  Dr. Katar Singh, Institute of Rural Management in Anand, India, spent January
through May of 1989 at the Workshop screening articles related to the forestry
sector, learning how to use our data base, and completing the first draft of a
monograph, "A Framework for Collecting and Analyzing Information for Case Studies
in Common-Pool Resource Management," to be co-authored with Elinor Ostrom during
the forthcoming year.  Dr. Jos Raadschelders, University of Leiden, intends to
spend the spring semester of 1990 at the Workshop in order to learn our framework
and begin to design a major study of Dutch farmer-organized drainage associations
drawing on historical materials extended back over 1,000 years.  Dr. Christine
Picht, University of Mainz, is currently spending a two-year period at the Workshop
(with field trips to Switzerland) writing a closely parallel monograph on CPR
institutions in the Swiss Alps.  Dr. Anil K. Gupta, Indian Institute of Management
and Dr. Kuldeep Mathur, Chairman, Centre for Political Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru
University, have both inquired about working with our CPR project during the 1990-
91  academic  year.   Michel  Griffon,  directeur  adjoint  of  CIRAD  (Centre  de
Cooperation Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Developpement), has
invited Elinor Ostrom to Paris in October to present a seminar on the CPR data base
and explore how it could be modified for use in the analysis of CPR problems in the
Sahel.  Several members of the Research Staff at CIRAD will then spend a couple of
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months in Bloomington during 1990.
.  The most recent request came from Francis T. Christy, Jr., who indicated that
the archive files at FAO in Rome on inshore fisheries around the world are very
rich and untapped.  He has invited Elinor Ostrom to join a working group on
"Critical Factors Affecting the Management of Small-Scale Fisheries" to meet at FAO
in Rome mid-September.  Unfortunately, time does not permit participation, but we
will explore other ways of working cooperatively with FAO in the future.
.  Since some of the studies are based on fieldwork that extended over a one- or
two-year period, this is a modest estimate assuming only an average of 6 months of
fieldwork for each of the 86 studies that have been coded.
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Section II
RELATIONSHIP OF CODING AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
Drawing on literature in political science, economics, anthropology,
game  theory,  and  law,  scholars  have  developed  a  general  framework  of
institutional analysis and development (IAD) that identifies the key working
parts  of  typical  situations  facing  participants  in  various  circumstances
(Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Oakerson, 1986; E. Ostrom, 1986).  The focal point of
the IAD framework is the action situation in which individuals adopt actions
or  strategies.   Depending  on  such  factors  as  the  number  of  participants
involved, the types of choices available to participants, and the incentives
faced by participants, different outcomes may result from interactions among
participants.  Many collective-action problems in irrigation systems resemble
situations  where  individuals  trying  to  advance  their  interests  end  up
producing unintended and harmful consequences for themselves as well as for
others.  
Like the IAD framework, transaction costs economics adopts transactions,
which resemble the concept of an action situation, as the fundamental unit of
analysis (Williamson,  1975; 1985).

  Both transaction  costs economics  and
institutional  analysis  are  concerned  with  identifying  appropriate
institutional arrangements that can counteract perverse incentives inherent in
various transaction situations.  While transaction costs economics approach
the  problem  by  examining  the  characteristics  of  different  transaction
situations, the IAD framework explicitly identifies a higher level of analysis
by delineating the contextual attributes that shape various action situations.
At  the  contextual  level  of  analysis,  one  examines  how  rules,  physical
attributes, and attributes of community shape various action situations. 
Transaction Costs and Institutional Arrangements
An individual's choice of action in any particular situation depends on
how the individual weighs the benefits and costs of various alternatives and
their likely outcomes.  In an attempt to pursue benefits, an individual,
however, is constrained by his limited information-processing ability.  In
other words, rationality is bounded.  In many economic models, for the sake of
simplification,  an  individual  is  assumed  to  be  able  to  process  all  the
information relevant to a decision situation.  The individual is assumed to be
able to undertake all necessary computations to reach a decision that could
maximize his or her expected utilities.  This assumption has been challenged
by  many.   Herbert  Simon,  for  example,  argues  that  human  behavior  is
"intendedly  rational  but  only  limitedly  so"  (1961:  xxiv).   Because  the
information  processing  capabilities  of  humans  are  limited,  individuals
frequently make decisions without considering all the possible alternatives
and their likely outcomes.  Organizations, Simon argues, compensate for this
human limitation by assigning each individual a limited task environment and
standard operating procedures.  Institutions that regulate ways of undertaking
activities can also be considered as stores of acquired knowledge.  In the
words of Richard Langlois:
institutions have an information-support function.  They are, in effect,
interpersonal  stores  of  coordinative  knowledge;  as  such,  they
serve to restrict at once the dimensions of the agent's problem-
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situation and the extent of the cognitive demands placed upon the
agent (1986: 237). 
To develop mutually beneficial arrangements in irrigation, participants
need  rudimentary  information  about  the  physical  and  technological
characteristics of the water flow and water delivery facilities, as well as
the respective interests of the participants related to the irrigation system.
Their  existing  information  and  their  ability  to  gain  further  information
affect their  ability to  develop appropriate  institutional arrangements  to
tackle their problems in water allocation and maintenance.
The  long-term  viability  and  performance  of  a  set  of  institutional
arrangements also depend on its ability to process information necessary for
effective operation and maintenance.  F. A. Hayek (1948) argues that a major
economic problem of society is the continuous utilization of information about
circumstances of specific time and place.  In irrigation, effective water
allocation and maintenance require knowledge about the topography, soil types,
and crop patterns of the particular area.  It is important to ensure that
these kinds of information are utilized when making decisions in relation to
water allocation and maintenance. 
Opportunism, defined as "self-interest seeking with guile," is another
important  attribute  of  individuals  that  affects  collective  action  in
irrigation systems (Williamson, 1985: 47).  Opportunism, in conjunction with
bounded rationality, creates difficulties for both negotiating and enforcing
cooperative agreements.  In the process of negotiation, individuals may try to
hide their true preferences from one another in order to secure a better deal,
thus hindering the negotiation process.  After individuals have entered into
some form of mutually agreed contract, disputes may arise as to the proper
interpretation of the contract when novel situations appear or new individuals
are involved.  This is especially the case because it is impossible to devise
rules  that  take  into  account  all  possible  contingencies  in  the  future.
Furthermore, individuals who have entered into a contract with others may
still  be  inclined  to  take  advantage  of  their  fellow-contractors  if
circumstances allow them to do so.
Transaction costs economics focus on the potential disputes that may
arise  when  individuals,  who  are  characterized  by  bounded  rationality  and
opportunism, enter into contractual relationships (Williamson, 1975; 1985).
Contrary to the assumption of "legal centralism" that the resolution of these
disputes requires adjudication by an external authority, Williamson argues,
most disputes can be avoided by recognizing "potential conflict in advance and
[devising] governance structures that forestall or attenuate it" (Williamson,
1985: 29).  These governance structures represent institutional arrangements
that participants voluntarily adopt in order to foster credible commitments
and to facilitate recurrent transactions among themselves.  The organizational
imperative  emerging  from  considering  bounded  rationality  and  opportunism,
Williamson argues, is: "Organize transactions so as to economize on bounded
rationality while  simultaneously safeguarding  them against  the hazards  of
opportunism" (1985: 32). 
The transaction costs economics literature studies contractual problems
mostly in relation to the exchange of private goods (i.e., goods that are
characterized by the ease of exclusion and subtractibility of resource units)
such as labor and machinery (see Joskow, 1988; Putterman, 1986).  Williamson
(1985) distinguishes three principal dimensions of a transaction that are
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related to different organizational problems.  First, some transactions are
characterized by asset specificity which "refers to durable investments that
are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the opportunity cost of
which investments is much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative
users should the original transaction be prematurely terminated" (Williamson,
1985: 55).  
Second, some transactions are subject to uncertainty caused by their
environments  and  their  participants'  opportunistic  behavior.   This
uncertainty, if accompanied by significant amounts of transaction-specific
assets, induces participants to devise institutional arrangements capable of
sequential adaptation.   Third,  transactions are  undertaken with  different
frequencies.  If a certain kind of transaction is needed only infrequently, it
may not be cost-effective to establish elaborate institutional arrangements to
handle the transactions even if transaction-specific assets are involved.  On
the other hand, specialized institutional arrangements will be more cost-
effective if large transactions of a recurring kind are involved. 
In irrigation, highly transaction-specific assets are involved: once
constructed,  irrigation  facilities  such  as  dams  or  canals  can  hardly  be
relocated or redeployed for other uses.  In some arid areas, farmland is a
highly  transaction-specific  asset  whose  value  depends  on  the  effective
functioning of an irrigation system.  If an irrigation system is used by many
individuals,  one  individual's  opportunistic  behavior  can  affect  others
considerably.  
Uncertainty is also an important factor affecting collective action in
irrigation systems.  Uncertainty may result from the lack of trust among
irrigators.  If irrigators cannot trust one another, it is difficult for them
to develop and sustain cooperative arrangements among themselves.  Uncertainty
may also result from external factors that are beyond the immediate control of
participants.   In  watercourses  within  some  large  government  irrigation
systems, for example, the amount of water available may vary unpredictably,
subject to arbitrary decisions made by government officials operating at the
system level.  Frequencies  of  transactions  also  affect  the  choice  of
institutional arrangements.  For example, in irrigation systems that require
extensive cooperative efforts in maintenance, elaborate input rules may be
needed to specify and coordinate contributions from individual irrigators.  In
systems that require only occasional maintenance, no specific input rules may
even be necessary.
Farmers' Degree of Dependency on an Irrigation System 
The degree of dependency of farmers on an irrigation system may affect
their  incentives  to  cooperate  with  one  another  in  fairly  complex  and
counterintuitive ways.  Farmers are dependent on an irrigation system in two
different senses: (1) they may depend on the system as a major source of
income (i.e., their incomes derive mostly from cultivating crops irrigated by
the system); and (2) they may depend on the system as a major source of water
for irrigation.  Depending on the circumstances, farmers' dependency on an
irrigation system as a major source of income may either facilitate or impede
collective action. 
In most situations, the more irrigators depend on an irrigation system,
the more likely they are willing to expend substantial private resources to
operate and maintain the system.  Irrigators without other job obligations are
also more likely to be able to participate in collective activities in an
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irrigation system.  In other situations, if most farmers do not have other
sources of income, it may be difficult for them to develop new cooperative
ventures  that  require  substantial  capital  investment  or  sacrifice  before
producing benefits to the investors.
By the same token, the availability of alternative water sources may
increase or decrease farmers' incentives for cooperation.  In some situations,
the availability of an alternative source of water may reduce tension among
irrigators when water flow in the system is scarce, thus facilitating their
long-term cooperation.  In other situations, irrigators with access to an
alternative source of water may be less willing to contribute to operating and
maintaining the system than those without, thus inhibiting their long-term
cooperation.  
To further understand how these three transactional dimensions affect
governance in irrigation systems, it is necessary to analyze systematically
contextual attributes that shape various action situations.  According to the
IAD framework mentioned earlier, three sets of contextual attributes structure
the action situation facing participants in an irrigation system: (1) physical
attributes  of  the  irrigation  system;  (2)  attributes  of  the  community  of
participants;  and  (3)  the  set  of  institutional  arrangements  in  use  by
participants (see Kiser and Ostrom, 1982).  These three sets of attributes
combine  to  create  different  incentives  and  constraints  for  participants.
Participants, who are characterized by bounded rationality and opportunism,
will react differently according to the incentives and constraints inherent in
the situations they face.  The strategic interactions among participants in an
action situation produce different outcomes (see Figure 2.1). 
Outcomes for participants in irrigation systems include: (1) whether the
water supply in the system meets the water requirements of the crops in the
established fields served by the system, (2) whether the water diversion and
delivery facilities are well-maintained, and (3) whether some participants




Some  of  these  outcomes  are  influenced  by  the  extent  to  which
participants  cooperate  in  the  operation  and  maintenance  of  a  system.
Cultivators' active cooperation is essential for maintaining water diversion
and  delivery  facilities.   Whether  these  facilities  are  well-maintained
reflects the degree of cooperation among cultivators.  In some situations,
however, outcomes may be beyond the immediate control of the participants.
The volume of water flow in a river at any particular moment, for example, is
frequently a result of physical and meteorological factors that are beyond






Different outcomes may be related to different action situations faced
by participants.  Outcomes of one action situation may become contextual
attributes for another situation.  The level of water supply in a system may
be partly a result of the way participants constructed the system in the first
place.  Once constructed, the amount of water supplied by the system becomes a
physical  attribute  that  affects  irrigators'  incentives  to  cooperate  in
maintaining the system. 
Physical and Community Attributes
Most irrigation systems are characterized by "difficulties of exclusion"
and "subtractibility of resource units."  These physical attributes create
collective-action  situations  among  irrigators  in  most  irrigation  systems.
Besides these three, other physical attributes including the size of the
irrigation  system,  the  pattern  of  water  supply,  and  the  availability  of
alternative water sources affect interactions among irrigators.  Community
attributes such as irrigators' sources of incomes and the presence or absence
of social, economic, cultural, and locational differences among irrigators
also affect irrigators' incentives to cooperate with one another.

  Either by
itself or in combination with other attributes, each of these attributes
potentially affects collective action and outcomes in an irrigation system.
The constraints and opportunities created by these attributes have to be taken
into  account  when  designing  institutional  arrangements  for  an  irrigation
system. 
Water Scarcity and Uncertainty
Farmers' vulnerability to scarcity and uncertainty in water supply and
its effects on their incentives for collective action have drawn special
attention in the irrigation literature.  Wickham and Valera (1979), in a study
of irrigation projects in the Philippines, observe that in order to induce
farmers to cooperate in managing their watercourses, an effective system-wide
management program is a prerequisite.  In other words, farmers have less
incentive to organize if they do not have a predictable or sufficient flow of
water into their watercourses in the first place.  This observation seems to
contradict that of Wade (1988a) who, drawing upon experiences in South India,
argues that the greater scarcity and uncertainty of the water supply, the
greater the likelihood that a community of cultivators will develop collective
arrangements to govern their watercourse. 
Although these two arguments appear to be directly contradictory, they
may be consistent when presented in a more general context.  Irrigators'
vulnerability to scarcity and uncertainty in water supply may be related to
their  incentives  for  cooperation  in  a  curvilinear  manner  (see  Uphoff,
Wickramasinghe, and Wijayaratna, 1990).  Farmers have to be sure of at least
some  minimal  availability  of  water  before  they  are  willing  to  invest  in
collective efforts in water allocation and maintenance.  If the water supply
is abundant, however, investments in water allocation and maintenance would
make little sense as water will be available anyhow.  But under conditions of
moderate scarcity, keeping regular water allocation and maintenance schedules
may strongly affect the amount of water available to farmers' fields.  Thus,
little collective action by farmers can be expected under conditions of either
extreme abundance or scarcity.  Most collective activities will occur in
situations where water is barely sufficient or moderately scarce and farmers
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believe that their collective efforts can improve their chance of securing a
more reliable supply of water.

An inadequate  supply of  water, however,  could increase  coordination
costs among farmers.  As the supply of water decreases, the temptation for
free-riding  in  water  acquisition  increases;  efforts  in  monitoring  and
sanctioning have to be increased to enforce discipline in water allocation.
Furthermore, more conflicts are likely to arise among irrigators as they are
competing for a scarce source of water.  In some situations, farmers may be
able to increase the water flow to their fields by damaging, for instance, the
canal embankment.  This again increases the difficulty for maintaining the
irrigation system.  All of these could increase the costs for organizing
collective action in irrigation. 
Irrigated Area and Number of Irrigators
Even if individual irrigators are willing to contribute to collective
endeavors, they have to expend resources to organize among themselves to
assign responsibilities and undertake water allocation and maintenance jobs.
Both the size of the irrigation system and the number of users of the system
may affect farmers' actions.  Many authors argue that, all other things being
equal, information-gathering, communication, decision-making, and monitoring
costs increase as the size of a resource increases.  By the same token,
various  kinds  of  transaction  costs  increase  as  the  number  of  irrigators
increases (Field, 1986; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962).  These two arguments
imply that, all other things being equal, it will be easier to organize
collective action in irrigation systems of smaller sizes and with less users.
Although  it  is  more  costly  to  organize  collective  action  in  large
irrigation systems, this does not mean that large systems are doomed to fail.
In many circumstances, in order to take advantage of a large source of water,
it is more economical to develop a system that irrigates extensive areas and
serves many farmers.  Depending on the kinds of institutional arrangements
adopted, coordination problems in large systems can be solved in various
manners.   
The type of institutional arrangement that is needed to overcome the
problem of organizing large-scale irrigation has long been of interest to
social scientists.  Wittfogel's thesis that large-scale irrigation (hydraulic
agriculture) requires the discipline and direction by an external authority is
probably the most famous theory about irrigation known to a general social
science audience.

  Wittfogel wrote:  
A large quantity of water can be channeled and kept within bounds only
by the use of mass labor; and this mass labor must be coordinated,
disciplined, and led.  Thus a number of farmers eager to conquer
arid lowlands and plains are forced to invoke the organizational
devices which--on the basis of premachine technology--offer the
one chance of success: they must work in cooperation with their
fellows and subordinate themselves to a directing authority (1981:
18).  
Wittfogel further argued that the need to direct and enforce cooperation in
constructing and operating major hydraulic works induced the development of
highly centralized bureaucratic regimes in many parts of the world. 
This  thesis,  however,  has  been  contradicted  by  many  examples  where
farmers or local communities have been able to assemble and discipline massive
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local labor and other resources to construct and sustain irrigation systems
with command areas of over several hundred hectares (e.g., Lando, 1979; Siy,
1982; Pradhan, 1983). These systems are not governed by any single, unified
bureaucratic machinery.  Instead, federated forms of arrangements are adopted
such  that  the  entire  system  is  governed  by  multiple  layers  of  farmers'
organizations.  
Differences among Irrigators 
Irrigators may be different from one another in: (1) their cultural and
social characteristics such as ethnicity, caste, race, clan, or religion; (2)
the amounts of irrigated land or water shares they hold; or (3) the locations
of their plots within the system.  These differences are important contextual
attributes that affect collective action in irrigation. 
If a community of irrigators is divided by ethnic, clan, racial, caste,
or religious differences that inhibit communication, the costs of organizing
collective  action  within  the  community  will  be  higher  than  within  those
without divisions.  In some situations, the divisions among irrigators may be
great enough to inhibit any form of cooperation among them.  Cases, however,
exist where communities with ethnic, caste, or other divisions are able to
overcome  these  obstacles,  and  develop  and  sustain  long-term  cooperative
arrangements.  In these situations, high levels of potential disagreements and
conflicts among irrigators still exist.  Institutional arrangements that can
mitigate and resolve potential conflicts among farmers and ensure a more
equitable sharing of benefits and burdens among irrigators help to sustain
their cooperative efforts. 
Some literature suggests that a collective good is likely to be provided
if a few individuals have disproportionate interests in the good, since these
individuals have more to gain from the good and may find it in their own
interests to provide the good by themselves or expend resources to organize
other potential beneficiaries to provide the good (e.g., Olson, 1965).  In
irrigation, this means that the presence of individuals with disproportionate
landholding or shares of the water flow facilitates collective efforts in
water allocation and investment.  Contrary to this argument, some authors
argue  that  a  highly  unequal  distribution  of  landholding  inhibits  local
cooperation  in  operating  and  maintaining  irrigation  facilities  (e.g.,
Palanisami  and  Easter,  1986).   Farmers  with  disproportionate  wealth  and
influence may be reluctant to cooperate with poorer farmers; or if they do,
they expect more privileges and benefits (Harriss, 1977).  
Irrigators  may  have  unequal  access  to  the  flow  of  water.   This
difference among irrigators also affects their incentives for cooperation.  In
most canal irrigation systems, headenders have a natural advantage in their
access  to  water  over  tailenders.   As  documented  by  many  authors,  unless
irrigation systems are well organized, headenders tend to take more water than
is necessary for the growth of their crops to the detriment of tailenders
(Bromley,  1982;  Chambers,  1977).   The  temptation  to  "overuse"  water  is
especially great for the cultivation of rice.  Rice is believed by many
farmers to be very sensitive to water shortage but tolerant to large amounts
of water.

  Standing water is also an important means to control the growth of
weeds.  For many farmers, to maintain as much water as possible in their rice
field is a good way to reduce the risk of lower yields and the amount of labor
required to clear weeds (see Abel, 1977).  Because of their more favorable
location  relative  to  tailenders,  headenders  may  have  little  incentive  to
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cooperate with tailenders in water allocation. 
The position of headenders is, of course, not invulnerable.  Tailenders
may go upstream and destroy their banks, gates, or valves and thus hurt the
headenders if no one sanctions them.  The possibility of destruction of their
diversion works induces headenders to cooperate with tailenders to a certain
extent.  On the other hand, when both headenders and tailenders implement a
set of enforceable allocation rules, headenders are probably in a better
position  to  negotiate  a  more  favorable  share  of  water  because  of  their
proximity to the source.
The situation is different in irrigation systems where most farmers
cultivate plots in both head and tail areas.  In this kind of system, most
farmers have vested interests in ensuring that enough water is delivered to
the tail area; this pattern of plot distribution can facilitate cooperation
among farmers.  In some irrigation systems, specific rules exist to make sure
that every farmer cultivates plots in both the head and tail areas (Coward,
1979).  
Physical and community attributes create the setting in which irrigators
interact with one another.  While many physical and community attributes of an
irrigation  system  affect  situations  faced  by  irrigators,  most  of  these
attributes do not have deterministic effects on the success or failure of
collective action.  In some cases, institutional arrangements can mitigate the
perverse effects of situations created by these attributes.
Rules-in-Use 
From  a  policy  perspective,  institutional  arrangements  are  the  most
important among the three contextual attributes underlying action situations
faced  by  irrigators.   Institutional  arrangements  are  rules  that  "are
potentially linguistic entities that refer to prescriptions commonly known and
used  by  a  set  of  participants  to  order  repetitive,  interdependent
relationships"  (E.  Ostrom,  1986:  22).   In  a  rule-structured  situation,
individuals select specific actions from a large set of allowable actions in
light of the incentives existing in the situation.  Rules as social artifacts
are subject to human design and intervention.  By identifying the capabilities
and limitations  inherent in  different institutional  arrangements, one  can
anticipate different patterns of social outcomes.  By changing rules, it is
possible  to  intervene  to  change  the  structure  of  incentives  faced  by
participants and the way they relate to one another.  Such interventions may
enhance or reduce irrigators' capabilities to allocate water and maintain an
irrigation system effectively. 
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Operational Rules 
Operational rules define who can participate in which situations; what
the participants may, must, or must not do; and how they will be rewarded or
punished.  Operational rules facilitate coordination among participants if the
participants share a common knowledge of these rules and are willing to follow
them.  In a world of rapidly expanding knowledge and changing circumstances,
rules have to be able to create enough predictability among individuals yet
permit  enough  flexibility  to  deal  with  various  contingencies  (V.  Ostrom,
1989).   In  irrigation  systems,  four  kinds  of  operational  rules  are
particularly important for solving collective-action problems.

Boundary Rules  
A  key  precondition  for  successful  collective  action  in  common-pool
resources is the effective enforcement of a set of boundary rules that limits
the number of individuals who are entitled to resource units (E. Ostrom, 1990;
Schlager and Ostrom, 1987).  Without a well-defined set of rights holders, it
is difficult for actual and potential users to negotiate and enforce a common
set of rules coordinating various water allocation and investment activities.
Arthur Maass and Raymond Anderson, for example, argue, "The strength and
coherence of local irrigation organizations in developed regions appears to be
correlated with an irrigation community's success in limiting or stabilizing
growth, thereby gaining security for its members" (Maass and Anderson, 1986:
368).

  The existence of a closed set of rights holders also distinguishes a
common-property resource from an open-access resource (Bromley, 1984).  Norman
Uphoff suggests that because the resource and the users are more definite in
regard to irrigation, water user associations tend to outperform other local
organizations  responsible  for  such  resources  as  forests  and  grazing  land
(Uphoff, 1986b: 27-28). 
Several boundary requirements are frequently used in irrigation systems:
(1) ownership or leasing of land within a specified location, (2) ownership or
leasing of shares in water delivery facilities, (3) ownership or leasing of
shares to a certain proportion of the water flow, (4) payment of certain entry
fees, and (5) membership in an organization.  A boundary rule may consist of
only one requirement or a combination of requirements.  
Allocation Rules  
Allocation rules prescribe the procedure for withdrawing water from an
irrigation system.  They are important especially when the supply of water is
inadequate to meet the crop requirements of all cultivators simultaneously.
If allocation rules are effectively enforced, they can reduce uncertainty and
conflict among irrigators in relation to water withdrawal.  Three types of
procedures--fixed  percentage,  fixed  time  slots,  and  fixed  order--are
frequently used in water allocation:
1.fixed percentage: the flow of water is divided into fixed proportions by
some physical device.
2.fixed time slots: each individual is assigned fixed time slots during which
he or she may withdraw water.
3.fixed orders: individuals take turns to get water.
Each of these procedures may be based on different premises such as
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amount of land held, amount of water needed for cultivation, number of shares
held, historical pattern of use, location of fields, or official discretion.
For example, an allocation rule may require each irrigator to withdraw water
in specific time slots.  The length of the slot for an irrigator may be
determined by the amount of land he holds, e.g., the more land he holds, the
longer the time period to which he is entitled.  As shown in Table 2.1, there
are many possible combinations of water distribution procedures and bases.

 
Depending on such diverse attributes as the degree of water scarcity,
length and structure of the water carrying facilities, the types of crops
cultivated, and the monitoring devices available, different allocation rules
may be appropriate under various situations.  Among them, the degree of water
scarcity deserves specific discussion.  The degree of water scarcity affects




Input rules prescribe the types and amounts of resources required of
each cultivator.  In systems that are owned and run entirely by irrigators,
irrigators have to raise their own resources to finance their own organization
and to construct and maintain water delivery facilities.  In large-scale,
government-built  irrigation  systems,  human  and  material  resources  from
irrigators could also be effective and reliable inputs for developing and
maintaining systems.  An irrigator may be required to contribute four major
types of inputs: (1) regular water tax; (2) labor for regular maintenance; (3)
labor for emergency repair; and (4) labor, money, or materials for major
capital investment.  Each of these input requirements may be based on one of
two kinds of premises--equal or proportional.  Equal rules simply require
equal  contribution  from  all  irrigators.   Proportional  rules  require
contributions from irrigators roughly in proportion to the benefits each gets
from the system, e.g., proportional to one's share of the system, to the
amount of land cultivated, or to the amount of water needed (see Table 2.2). 
Some scholars argue that if farmers are required to contribute labor to
maintenance, the inputs required of a farmer should be proportional to the
benefits he or she receives.  Chambers (1977), for example, argues that in
order to have effective maintenance, inputs required of an irrigator should be
proportional to the benefits he or she receives.  Chambers writes: 
Communal labor is most likely to be effective where the community will
benefit directly and where labor obligations are proportional to
expected benefits....  Conversely, where there is no direct link
between  the  work  done  and  the  benefits  gained,  communal
maintenance will be much more difficult (1977: 354). 
According to this principle, proportional input rules should be more
effective  for  maintenance  than  equal  input  rules.   There  are,  however,
exceptions to this principle.  First, if an irrigation system only requires
relatively small amounts of labor inputs for regular maintenance every year,
the costs of implementing proportional rules could exceed their potential
benefits.  Second, if an important structure, such as the diversion dam, of an
irrigation system is 
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Tables 2.1 and 2.2 here
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destroyed and requires emergency repair, it may be easier to implement equal
contribution rules than proportional rules.
Penalty Rules 
In  most  cases,  rules  will  be  ineffective  unless  rule-breakers  are
subject to punishment.  Some possible penalties against rule-breakers include
community shunning, fines, temporary or permanent loss of rights to water, and
incarceration.  Which of these penalties is more effective in deterring rule-
breakers  depends  on  the  features  of  the  community  of  irrigators  and  the
monitoring  mechanisms  available.   In  a  closed  and  homogeneous  community,
community  shunning  may  be  sufficient  to  deter  rule-breakers.   In  a  more
diverse and heterogeneous community, more substantial penalties such as fines
are necessary.  More serious penalties, such as loss of rights to water and
incarceration, may not be suitable for every irrigation community because
these kinds of penalties may induce a high level of conflict among irrigators.
Unless backed by an external authority with legal power for imposing coercion,
these penalties may be difficult to enforce.  
Collective-Choice Arrangements  
Operational rules establish constraints that, if properly designed and
followed, facilitate cooperation among participants in various collective-
action situations in irrigation.  Operational rules, however, are not self-
generating nor self-enforcing.  In most cases, institutional arrangements have
to be established to adjudicate conflicts, enforce decisions, and formulate
and modify operational rules.  These institutional arrangements represent a
second set of rules--collective-choice rules.  The study of processes used to
create, enforce, and modify collective-choice rules is a different level of
institutional analysis--the constitutional level (V. Ostrom, 1987) (see Figure
2.3).
Collective-choice arrangements for determining, enforcing, and altering
operational rules are especially important in view of participants' bounded




devise operational rules that anticipate all kinds of contingencies; disputes
among participants as to the proper meanings and scopes of operational rules
could  arise  frequently.   Collective-choice  arrangements  structure  the
processes  by  which  disputes  among  participants  can  be  settled.   Given
opportunism,  individuals  are  inclined  to  take  advantage  of  their  fellow-
contractors;  collective-choice  arrangements  that  sanction  against  rule-
breaking  behavior  are  important  for  sustaining  mutually-productive
relationships.   Furthermore,  in  a  world  of  changing  knowledge  and
environments, operational rules adopted at one time may become obsolete at
another;  institutional  arrangements  that  facilitate  the  adoption  and
modification of rules enable participants to respond to these changes.  
Multiple Levels of Collective-Choice Entities 
Different sets of collective-choice rules and different communities of
participants may be involved in collective-choice situations.  Depending on
attributes such as the size and the number of users of the irrigation system,
different  collective-choice  entities  may  be  constituted  to  exercise
collective-choice prerogatives on behalf of the users and other concerned
parties.  Some irrigation systems, for example, are governed solely by a
national government agency; operational rules may be created, changed, and
enforced by reference to statutes adopted by the national legislature or
executive.  The collective-choice entity in this case involves not just one
specific  community  of  irrigators  but  also  potential  irrigators,  interest
groups, politicians, government officials, and the general public who share an
interest in irrigation and other related activities.  In some other irrigation
systems, the collective-choice entity is constituted solely by irrigators who
adopt and enforce their own collective-choice and operational rules. 
Sometimes, a community of irrigators may be subject to multiple sets of
operational  rules  adopted  by  different  collective-choice  entities.   For
example, irrigators in large irrigation systems may be simultaneously subject
to two sets of operational rules adopted by two different collective-choice
entities--a collective-choice entity at the system level and another at a sub-
system  level.

  Collective-choice  entities  at  the  sub-system  level,
constituted by farmers themselves, are important for the effective operation
and maintenance of large irrigation systems.  First, what kinds of water
allocation and input rules are the most effective and how these rules should
be implemented depend much on such specific attributes as the soil type, field
topography,  cropping  pattern,  and  the  amount  of  water  available  in  the
specific irrigated area.  Frequent, quick, but non-routine decisions have to
be made about water allocation and maintenance in response to changes such as
the volume of water flow, climate, and the growth stage of plants.  In many
large irrigation systems, different watercourses vary in these attributes. If
there is only one collective-choice entity to create and enforce one uniform
set of operational rules for an entire system, it is unlikely that the set of
rules  could  serve  the  needs  of  all  watercourses  equally  well.   Local
collective-choice entities at the watercourse level, if properly constituted,
are likely to facilitate the utilization of "information of specific time and
place" in formulating and enforcing appropriate operational rules and choices
(Hayek, 1948). 
Second,  collective-choice  entities  at  the  sub-system  level  involve
irrigators in formulating their own rules.  Irrigators are more likely to have
incentives to follow and enforce rules adopted by themselves than those handed
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down from an outside authority.  Irrigators can also mobilize various informal
mechanisms such as social shunning to enforce their own rules, mechanisms
unavailable to any external officials. 
While  collective-choice  entities  at  the  sub-system  level  facilitate
adaptation to the specific needs of various irrigation units, a collective-
choice entity at the system level is necessary to deal with broader collective
problems  such  as  the  allocation  of  water  among  watercourses  and  the
maintenance of diversion works for the entire system.  The collective-choice
entities at the sub-system level, however, can still maintain their autonomy
in relation to water allocation and maintenance within their respective areas.
By constituting different levels of collective-choice entities to deal with
collective-action problems of different scopes, many coordination and control
problems associated with large irrigation bureaucracies can be avoided.  
Collective-Choice Rules  
Individuals  may  have  little  incentive  to  follow  rules  unless  they
believe that their noncompliance will result in substantial punishment.  Long-
term cooperation among a large group of individuals depends on arrangements
that help monitor and sanction against noncompliance (see Hechter, 1987).
Mutual monitoring among irrigators can be a means of rule enforcement.  It may
be effective in situations where (1) only a small group of individuals is
involved, (2) each individual's activities can be easily observed by others,
and (3) each individual has an incentive to monitor others' activities in
order to protect his or her own rights.  When many individuals are involved,
however, the provision of monitoring is itself subject to the free-riding
problem because an individual may have incentives to save the time and energy
for monitoring others' activities, hoping that others will do the monitoring
job for him.  Specialized officials may be needed to enforce rules.  Many
cooperative  activities  in  irrigation  benefit  from  the  involvement  of
specialized officials. 
Officials  vested  with  special  prerogatives  in  rule  formulation  and
enforcement, however, are frequently in a position to interpret rules to their
own advantage or demand favor from irrigators when adjudicating their disputes
or distributing their water shares.  This potential opportunistic behavior of
officials is a permanent danger in any collective-choice entity.  The design
of institutional arrangements that can ensure the accountability of irrigation
officials  has  been  a  major  concern  of  the  literature  in  irrigation
organization and management (Hunt, 1989; Coward, 1980; Chambers, 1988; Wade,
1988b). 
To ensure  the responsiveness  of irrigation  officials to  irrigators,
rules  are  needed  to  stipulate  how  irrigation  officials  are  selected  and
removed, to whom they have to report, and how they are compensated for their
services.  These collective-choice rules affect the structures of incentives
faced by these officials and their services to irrigators.  These officials
are more likely to be responsive to irrigators' needs if (1) their tenures are
subject to periodic votes by irrigators, (2) they have to report to irrigators
in general meetings or hearings periodically, and (3) their salaries depend on
direct contributions from irrigators. 
The Relationship of the Framework to the Data Base
When designing a data base to code information about a diversity of 
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irrigation systems (as well as inshore fisheries, grazing areas, forests, and 
other CPRs), it is difficult to establish a one-to-one correspondence between 
the working parts of the framework and the working parts of the data base.  In
Section III of this manual, we describe the working parts of the relational 
data base in some detail and later in this manual we include all of the coding
forms.
Concentrating for now on the coding forms that are directly related to 
the physical and material conditions, attributes of community, and rules-in- 
use that affect the structure of an action situation and its outcomes, the 
related coding forms used in the CPR data base are shown on Figure 2.4.  Thus,
most of the information that we use related to the physical and materials 
conditions of a CPR are coded on the Appropriation Resource Coding Form and 
the Location Coding Form.  The Operational Level Coding Form and the Subgroup 
Coding Form contain information about:  (1) Attributes of a Community, (2) the
Action Situation, (3) Patterns of Interactions, and (4) Outcomes.  The 
Operational Rules Form contains information about the Operational Rules-in- 
Use.  
We use four more coding forms in the CPR data base.  They all relate to 
the collective and constitutional-choice levels of analysis.  The 
Country/Region/Time Coding Form enables us to code information about the 
general constitutional-choice processes related to the area where a CPR is 
located.  The Organization Structure and Process Coding Form allows us to code




particular CPR.  The Interorganizational Level Coding Form allows us to code 
information about higher-level organizations that are related to the 
organizations directly affecting operational rules.  And the Organizational 
Inventory matrix, enables us to code information about all of the 
organizations that affect the production, distribution, appropriation, and use
activities in a particular CPR.
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Notes for Section II
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.  The concept "action situation" is broader than "transaction" because the former
deals with all kinds of social situations while the latter concerns specific 
exchanges between or among people.
.  Other outcomes such as cropping intensities and agricultural productivity are 
important too. I do not focus on them in this study because information about them 
is generally absent in case studies on irrigation systems.  For a more extensive 
list of "objectives in irrigation management," see Uphoff (1986a: 20-21).
.  This is only a partial list of physical and community attributes that may 
affect collective action in irrigation systems.  Other attributes such as 
meteorological conditions and irrigators' cosmological views are also important 
variables to consider.  They are not discussed in this study because most cases do 
not provide detailed information about these attributes.
.  In some situations, water abundance may be a problem by itself and requires 
collective action for its solution.  For example, if the water flow is so abundant 
as to create drainage problems or threaten the physical integrity of the water 
diversion or delivery works, these kinds of situations could induce farmers to 
undertake intensive collective efforts to keep their system in a working condition.
.  Wittfogel distinguished between two types of irrigated agriculture--
hydroagriculture and hydraulic agriculture.  Hydroagriculture refers to small-scale
agriculture for which "strictly local tasks of digging, damming, and water 
distribution can be performed by a single hushandman, a single family, or a small 
group of neighbors, and in this case no far-reaching organizational steps are 
necessary" (Wittfogel, 1981: 18).  Hydraulic agriculture, on the other hand, deals 
with large amounts of water and requires elaborate organizational discipline to 
work.
.  Researchers, however, have discovered through experimentation that rice does 
not require a continuous stand of water during the growth period and that 
continuous flow of water through the field is necessary.  If farmers could follow a
rotational schedule for distributing water, a larger area could be cultivated by 
the same amount of water (Abel, 1977).
.  There are, of course, other kinds of operational rules.  I do not focus on 
them because they are in general less important than the four I am discussing here.
I will discuss other operational rules whenever relevant.
.  It is possible that individuals who control a water resource use their 
control to jack up the price of the crops they raise using that resource.  This 
situation, however, would happen only in isolated communities that do not have any 
connection with other marketing networks.  In locations that have regular 
connections with other marketing networks, individuals monopolizing a water source 
could not have much influence on the price of the crops they raise.
.  In the irrigation literature a distinction is often made between "water 
allocation" and "water distribution."  Martin and Yoder, for example, argue that 
   Water allocation is the assignment of entitlement to water from a system, both 
identifying the fields and farmers with access to water from the system and the 
amount and timing of the water to be delivered to each.  Water distribution refers 
to the physical delivery of water to the fields and may not conform to the water 
allocation (1986: 2).  
"Water allocation," as defined by Martin and Yoder, is analogous to what is called 
"bases" in this study; "water distribution" is analogous to water delivery 
"procedures."




The purpose of the Screening form is to determine the usefulness of articles to the research project
and whether they contain citations to other potentially useful articles. The articles that passed
this test are part of the SES Library at ASU and are available at seslibrary.asu.edu. Each
form typically has 4 components: 1) Instructions, 2) Variable descriptions, 3) Conceptual Basis for
variables, and 4) the coding form for the variables themselves. Not all forms have all 4 components.
This form, for example, dos not have a conceptual basis component.
If you would like to see the actual coded data from this project, please visit seslibrary.asu.
edu/seslibrary/cpr/query.
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Country Region Time Coding Form
This form is comprised of general questions concerning the capabilities and limits of citizens living
in this region regarding self organization (constitutional choice) and self governance (collective
choice). This section contains only the coding form for the variables themselves. There are no
instructions or variable descriptions.
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The purpose of this form is to capture general physical and institutional characteristics of the area in
which the resource(s) of interest is located. The location not only encompasses the appropriation
resource(s) but also other crucial features of the resource environment. For example, in many
inshore fisheries, the location entails the fishing ground(s) and the adjacent villages in which the
fishers reside. In irrigation cases, the location would include the irrigation system, the irrigated
fields, and the villages of the appropriators.
This form has a variable list sorted alphabetically and by concept.
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The purposes of this form are to (1) capture the major physical characteristics of the appropria-
tion resource, (2) delineate the boundary of the appropriation resource, and (3) describe how the
appropriation resource is related to the relevant resources for producing, distributing, and using
the unit.
This form has a variable list sorted alphabetically and by concept.
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Collective Choice Coding Form
This form is comprised of general questions concerning the nature of organizational structures for
Collective Choice. There are no explicit instructions for this form - it is very short.












































































































































































































































































Interorganizational Level Coding Form
This form is comprised of general questions concerning the nature of interorganizational structure.
As with the Collective Choice coding form, there are no explicit instructions for this form - it is
very short.









































































































































































































































Organizational Structure Coding Form
Before filling in this form, you have to fill in the Collective Choice Form. For the first round of
coding, you only have to code organizations that are related to the appropriation process of the
resource (i.e., organizations under column C4 ”Appropriation” in the Collective Choice Form.)
This form has a variable list sorted alphabetically.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Operational Level Coding Form
This form is used to characterize the operational level where individuals take direct actions or adopt
strategies for future actions, depending on expected contingencies. At this level, each individual
faces an action situation.
This form has a variable list sorted alphabetically and by concept.
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This form is used to characterize the Subgroups that act at operational level. This form is closely
related to the Operational level form.
This form has a variable list sorted alphabetically.
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Operational Rules Coding Form
This form is designed to provide information about the operational-level rules, particular to a single
subgroup who appropriates from this resource. This form is subgroup specific.
The questions on this form, what is being asked is ”what are the rules”, not ”what is the
behavior”. Rules are human-made prescriptions and proscriptions, but they may not be followed
or observed exactly as they are written or understood.
This form has a variable list sorted alphabetically.
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Nepal Irrigation Cases Short Coding Form
This form has questions specific to cases in Nepal. There are no instructions or variable lists.
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Access:  The right to enter a defined physical property.
Aggregation Rules:  These rules are applicable when authority rules assign 
multiple positions partial control over the same action.    Example:  Safe 
deposit boxes.
Allocation Rules:  Allocation rules prescribe the procedure for withdrawing 
water from an irrigation system: they are important especially when the supply
of water is inadequate to meet the crop requirements of all the cultivators 
simultaneously.  Three types of procedures:  1)  Fixed percentage; 2)  Fixed 
time slots; 3)  Fixed order
AGO:  Appropriator Group Organization
Appropriation:  Activity in relation to the resource that has been organized. 
Forms:  Collective Choice Coding Form (49)
Appropriation Resource:  One of four stages of the delivery of a resource:  
production, distribution, appropriation, and use.  Manual:  Coding 
Instructions, Appropriation Resource Coding Form (28)
Appropriation Resource Form:  Examines the boundaries and physical 
characteristics of an appropriation resource.  (from Tang, p.62)
Appropriators:  Appropriators are individuals who actually withdraw units from
the resource.
Authority Rules:  Authority rules define what appropriators must, must not, or
may do at a particular stage of the appropriation process in light of the 
actions taken by others and the conditions of the physical resource.
Boundary Rules:  The existence of a set of boundary rules that limits the 
number of individuals who have had rights to withdraw resource units is a key 
pre-condition for successful collective action in common pool resources.  
Without a well-defined set of rights holders, it will be difficult for actual 
and potential users to negotiate and enforce a common set of rules 
coordinating various water allocation and investment activities...The 
existence of a closed set of rights holders also distinguishes a common 
property resource from an open access resource.
Case; Case-study:  A case is an instance of a set of rules governing 
institutional use of a resource within a definable period of time.  If the 
rules change, we would have a new case. Similarly, if the resource changes, we
would also have a new case.
Collective Choice:  Collective decisions are made by officials (including 
citizens acting as officials) to determine, enforce, continue, or alter 
actions authorized within institutional arrangements.  Like individual 
strategies in the world of action, collective decisions are plans for future 
action.  Unlike individual strategies, collective decisions are enforceable 
against non-conforming individuals.  An individual failing to abide by a 
personal diet strategy, for example, may feel guilty, but no official has the 
power to enforce a diet plan.  Officials have the power, however, to enforce a
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collective plan such as a city ordinance.  City officials can impose sanctions
against individuals who violate the ordinance.  The authority to impose 
sanctions is a key attribute of the collective choice level of decision-
making.  (p.207-208, Kiser and Ostrom)
Collective Choice Form:  Examines the collective choice entities that govern 
an irrigation system.  (Tang, p.62)
Collective Choice Level - The level of action wherein people organize and act 
to take collective decisions concerning the rules for action and the structure
of their relations with others.  
Confidence Level:  Please use the following scale to append a Confidence Level
to each question contained on the remainder of this form.
Confidence level you have in your answer:
5 Very confident (author specifically provides information)
4 Mildly confident (author generally provides information)
3 Confident (a clear inference from this & other cases)
2 Sufficient information to make a reasoned guess
1 Sufficient information to make a guess but information is quite
ambiguous
Constitutional Choice:  Constitutional decisions are collective choices about 
rules governing future collective decisions to authorize actions.  
Constitutional choices, in other words, are decisions about decision rules.  
Organizing an enterprise is a constitutional decision about rules to constrain
future collective choices within the enterprise.  But constititional choice 
also continues beyond the initial organizing period, for as individuals react 
to consequences of earlier rules for collective decision-making, participants 
may change the rules to improve the result.  (p.208, Kiser and Ostrom)
De jure, De facto:  De jure basis means that the particular right is 
recognized by a formal collective choice institution/organization in the 
region or country where the resource is located.  Most often the collective 
choice institution is part of a formal judicial system, although 
administrative bodies are also included.  The esiest way to evaluate whether a
right has a de jure basis is if that right is challenged, the subgroup could 
have the right sustained either by a judicial or administrative body.  On the 
other hand, de facto basis means that the particular right is not recognized 
by a formal collective choice institution/organization.  Note that the right 
does exist.  The members of this subgroup have forged this right as amongst 
themselves and others.
Deontic Response Categories:  [Deontology: the theory or study of moral 
obligation]  Responses that are required, permitted, or forbidden.  In this 
manual, "R" = required, "P" = permitted, and "F" = forbidden.  
Distribution Resource:  The means by which water is brought from the 
production resource to the appropriation resource
Exclusion:  The right to determine who will have access to a resource or a 
share thereof and who will, therefore, be excluded.
Information Rules:  Information that may be recorded.
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Input Rules:  Input rules prescribe the types and amounts of resources 
required of each cultivator.  Four major types of inputs an irrigator may be 
required to contribute:  1) regular water tax;  2) labor for regular 
maintenance;  3) labor for emergency repair;  4) labor, money, or materials 
for major capital investment.  Input requirements based on one of two 
premises:  1) equal;  2) proportional.
Location Form:  Captures general physical and institutional characteristics of
the area in which the resource(s) of interest is/are located.  The location 
not only encompasses the appropriation resource(s) but also other crucial 
features of the resource environment.  For example, in many inshore fisheries,
the location entails the fishing ground(s) and the adjacent villages in which 
the fishers reside.  In irrigation cases, the location would include the 
irrigation system, the irrigated fields, and the villages of the 
appropriators.
Management:  The right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the 
resource by making improvements.
MIC:  Missing in Case
Operational:  Operational level - the arena of action of appropriators and 
others in their interaction with the appropriation resource.  (Forms: 
collective choice coding form (49))
Operational level:  The world of action; individuals functioning at this level
either take direct action or adopt a strategy for future actions, depending on
expected contengencies.  Decisions in a market or in a tennis game occur at 
this level.
 In a highly organized and free society, individuals are authorized to take a 
wide variety of actions at this level without prior agreement with other 
individuals.  Authority derives from institutional arrangements, including 
property law, business, and coporate law, and constitutional guarantee of 
individual freedom (pp. 207-208, Kisor & E. Ostrom, 1982.  The Three Worlds of
Action: A Metutheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches.  In 
Strategies of Political Inquiry.  Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, E. Ostrom 
ed.)
Operational Level Form:  Examines the types of situations faced by 
participants, the level of information available to them, their potential 
actions and levels of control, their patterns of interactions, and the 
outcomes they obtain.  Each operational level form reports a "time slice" 
during which the actions of the appropriators are relatively consistent.  By 
"relatively consistent," it is meant that the rules governing the 
appropriation resource, the community of appropriators, and the physical 
characteristics of the resource are the same through out the period when any 
one of these attributes coded for a new "time slice."  Therefore, there will 
be more than one case for each irrigation system if more than one operational 
level form is coded.
Operational Rules (OR):  Operational rules define who can participate in which
situations, what the participants may, must, or must not do, and how they will
be awarded or punished.  OR facilitate coordination among the participants if 
the participants share a common knowledge of these rules and are willing to 
follow them.  In a world of rapidly expending knowledge and changing 
circumstances, rules have to be able to create enough predictability among 
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individuals yet permit enough flexibility to deal with various contengencies. 
Four kinds of operational rules imp: 1) boundary rules; 2) allocation rules; 
3) input rules; and 4) penalty rules.
Operational Rules Form:  Examines the kinds of boundary authority, scope, 
information, payoff, and aggregation rules used in an appropriation resource. 
(Tang p. 62)
Organizational Structural Form:  Examines the structure and process of a 
collective choice entity.  Multiple organizational structure forms have to be 
filled out if more than one collective choice entity is involved in governing 
an appropriation resource. (Tang p. 62)
Organizational Inventory: Forms: Collective choice coding form (49)
Payoff Rules:  These rules specify the external rewards or sanctions that 
must, must not, or may be assigned to specific actions or outcomes.
Penalty Rules:  In most cases, rules will be ineffective unless there are 
penalty rules to punish rule-breakers.  Some possible penalties against rule 
breakers include community shienning, finer, temporary or permanent loss of 
rights to water and incarceration.
Production Resource:  The production of water for irrigation involes making 
water available at locations and times when it does not naturally occur in the
form of precipitation and immediate runoff.
Provision:  Provision ahs a distinct and separate meaning from production.  
The following quotation provides a definition for provision:
The organization of provision relates primarily to consuming, financing,
arranging for production, and monitoring the production of a set 
of goods and services.  Thus, in regard to rural infrastructure 
development, provision refers to the entire set of activities 
involved in articulating the demand for, financing, arranging for 
the production of, and monitoring the production of the activities
related to both the construction and maintenance of a facility.  
The organizational arrangments related to the provision of the 
construction of a facility may differ rather substantially from 
those related to the provision of its maintenance.  A highly 
organized process may exist to design and finance large-scale 
infrastructure projects.  This process may or may not involve the 
ultimate users but will frequently inovlve design engineers 
trained to undertake site studies of various types.  Institutional
Incentives and Rural Infrastructure Sustainability, Elinor Ostrom,
Larry Schroeder, and Susan Wynne, (Decentralization: finance & 
Management Project, Associates in Rural Development, Burlington, 
Vt., May 1990.)
Rules-in-use:  Are rules that the members of a sub-group are using in 
practice, rather than formal rules that may be written about the rights and 
duties of this subgroup.
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Scope Rules:  Scope rules specify the conditions in the world which must, must
not, or may be affected as a results of actions taken. 
Social Sanction:  Violators may achieve a bad reputation, be criticized, be 
excluded from other social activities, be shunned, or otherwise ostracized.
Subgroup Form:  Examines the stakes and resources, potential actions and 
levels of control, and strategies of participants in a subgroup.  There will 
be more than one subgroup and more than one subgroup form that has to be 
filled out if the participants in an appropriation resource are not relatively
symmetrical in their legal rights to appropriate water, their withdrawal rate 
from the resource, their exposure to variation in water supply, their level of
dependency on water from the resource, and how they use the water.  (Tang, 
p.62)
Transaction Costs:  Refer to the time, funds, and energy devoted to making and
enforcing decisions and rules.
Transfer:  The right to sell, lease, or bequeath all of the above rights in 
whole or in part.
Use:  Activity in relation to the resource that has been organized. For 
irrigation, this is the activity that the individual appropriator performs; he
brings water to his fields for use.  
Withdrawal:  The right to obtain the "products of a resource (e.g. catch fish,
appropriate water)."
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